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RIDE-ALONGS, PAPARAZZI, AND OTHER MEDIA
THREATS TO PRIVACY
Robert M. O'Neil *
I. INTRODUCTION

When the Supreme Court first addressed the status of "ridealongs"1 in late May of this year, the role of the news media could
have been treated in any of several ways. The law enforcement
officers, who were sued for invasion of privacy because they invited
reporters to accompany them while serving an arrest warrant in a
private home, offered several extenuations.2 The presence of
journalists, they argued, would provide direct information to the
general public about important news events.3 Moreover, reporters
who took part in the arrest could, in a sense, keep the police honest,
or at least make them more accountable to the citizenry.4 Finally,
the defendants candidly claimed that the participation of reporters
on such a mission might enhance the image of the law enforcement
agency itself.5 Thus, far from justifying civil liability in privacy
suits brought by aggrieved suspects, the ride-along practice should
warrant commendation.
The Supreme Court would hear none of this. The media presence,
in fact, seemed much more part of the problem than the solution.
The fact that those who "rode along" on the arrest were journalists
seemed at best irrelevant and at worst venal. The key to the case
was the privacy of the suspect citizen, a constitutional interest "at
the core of the Fourth Amendment."6 While the First Amendment
clearly "protect[s] press freedom from abridgment by government,"
that guarantee was of no avail here.7 None of the interests that the
law enforcement defendants advanced deserved more than passing
mention. As for the plausible claim that inviting reporters on such

* Professor of Law, University of Virginia; Director, Thomas Jefferson Center for the
Protection of Free Expression; President, Virginia Coalition for Open Government.
1. See Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999).
2. See id. at 1698.
3. See id.
4. See id.at 1699.
5. See id. at 1698.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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a mission might make police officers more accountable, the Court
reasoned that this goal could be equally well served by videotaping
the entry.8 Moreover, in the coup de grace, Chief Justice Rehnquist
cautioned that "the Washington Post reporters in the... [suspects']
home were working on a story for their own purposes. They were
not present for the purpose of protecting the officers, much less the
[suspects]."9
The tone of the opinion was as revealing as the result. While the
case did not directly implicate First Amendment interests of the
news media, the press was inescapably involved and unmistakably
affected by the outcome.' ° Whatever the frequency of ride-alongs of
this type, the practice seems to have become a legitimate source of
crime news, if less than universally endorsed." That the Justices
refused to credit any of the media-related claims in exoneration of
the police hosts in a civil damage suit may not be surprising. What
was perplexing, however, was the Court's tone and its view of the
media role in such a venture. Notably, the observation that
Washington Post reporters "were working on a story for their own
purposes" 2 is the unkindest of cuts. It seems to relegate media
interests to a substantially lower stature than in previous conflicts
between privacy and the press, to which we shall shortly turn. The
reporters' "purpose," presumably, was to prepare a story that would
inform readers of the national capital's major daily newspaper about
a major police raid. That "purpose" could best be served by being
present at the scene. Reporters could, moreover, keep an eye on law
enforcement activities during a sensitive confrontation. Yet none of
these factors seemed to mitigate the high Court's belief that
journalists had no more business than ordinary police buffs-perhaps
even less-in riding along when the arrest warrant was"served.

8. See id. at 1699.
9. Id.
10. A week later, the Court declined, without comment, to review a case in which a
federal appeals court deemed journalists who accompanied law enforcement agents on such
a mission to be "government actors" and thus potentially liable in damages, along with the
police, to the persons whose privacy had been invaded. See Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505
(9th Cir. 1998), cert.denied sub nom., Cable News Network v. Berger, 119 S. Ct. 2039 (1999).
New York Times reporter Linda Greenhouse observed that this action "had little significance
if any because the Ninth Circuit was already obliged to reconsider the case under the Court's
ruling [in Wilson v. Layne] last week." Linda Greenhouse, Justices Raise the Bar for
Convicting Drug Kingpins, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1999, at A18.
11. See, e.g., Adam Sandler & Cynthia Littleton, High Court Handcuffs Media on RideAlongs', DAILY VARIETY, May 25, 1999, at 4.
12. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1699.
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Privacy and the press have, in fact, coexisted with increasing
uneasiness in recent months. Since the tragic death of Princess
Diana, widely believed to have been caused by aggressive paparazzi,
public and political pressure for legal protection of personal privacy
has been steadily mounting. The United States Congress has
actively considered several bills that would impose new restraintsin one instance, sending photographers to jail for "persistently"
pursuing a subject to obtain unconsented footage or photo images for
commercial gain.13 The California legislature, often the leader in
national policy and hardly likely to be reticent in this area, enacted
a directly responsive law that took effect on January 1, 1999." That
law targets photographers who aggressively pursue subjects or
intrude upon their privacy-even by nonphysical means and from
public places-to capture unconsented images or words.'
In a sense, such legislation may already be redundant. Shortly
before it passed, the Supreme Court of California extended existing
privacy laws to provide recourse against "offensive intrusion" by the
media into private areas through the use of electronic devices
without a physical trespass. 6 Yet the political pressures in the
Golden State demanded something new from the legislature, despite
loud and persistent media pleas that such a law would have an
inescapably chilling effect on coverage of important news events.' 7
Even so, the popular demand for protection was not fully satisfied.
Barely had the new anti-paparazzi law gone into effect than the
California legislature turned its attention to yet another privacybased restraint-a bill that would greatly expand protection for

13. See H.R. 2448, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 97, 106th Cong. (1999); see also Anne E.
Hawke & Bruce D. Brown, No Pictures,Please:Anti-PaparazziLegislation ThreatensAll
Those Paid to Take Photos, LEGAL TIMEs, Feb. 15, 1999, at S34.
14. See CAL. CIrv. CODE § 1708.8 (West Cum. Supp. 1999).
15. See id.; see also Peter Sheridan, Muzzling the Snappers,EVENING STANDARD, Apr. 7,
1999, at 54.
16. See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1998). Alater Supreme
Court of California decision reaffirmed and extended this view. In Sanders v. American
BroadcastingCos., 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999), the court sustained a privacy claim against a
television station for broadcasting conversations that had been videotaped in the workplace
by a reporter posing as a coworker. See id. at 69. The appellate court rejected such a claim
because the conversations could have been overheard by others at the site, even though the
general public could not have entered. See id. at 71. The supreme court ruled, however, that
even in the workplace employees enjoyed a "limited, but legitimate" expectation of privacy
that the reporter's and the station's newsgathering methods had breached. Id. at 69.
17. See, e.g., Ann Oldenburg, PhotographersFear Privacy Law May Cloud View of
Shooting Stars, USAToDAY, Jan. 4, 1999, at 3D.
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celebrities' heirs against any commercial use of the image of a
famous or notable person after his or her death. 8
That such pressures to protect privacy have steadily mounted
seems beyond dispute. Why those pressures have risen so sharply
is less clear. A recent survey of popular attitudes invokes polls and
other survey data for the view that "Americans are edgier about
privacy because it seems more threatened than ever." 9 Princess
Diana's death surely was a major catalyst, though hardly the only
one. New technologies have contributed their share of anxiety.
Take the now-pending California celebrities' heirs bill, for example.
Screen Actors' Guild President Richard Masur testified in support
of this proposal, noting that digital technology increased the urgency
of such measures since it is now possible for the first time to
"morph" a dead person back to life, and thus to make the deceased
do and say things on a screen that he or she never would have said
or done-or at least never did.20 A central premise of the new
California anti-paparazzi law was the incredible reach of long-focus
lenses and parabolic microphones; such devices for the first time
make it possible to transcend long distances and penetrate once
impenetrable barriers to capture images and words long assumed to
be private. Richard Masur again offers helpful insight:
We feel the people of this country are really, really nervous about their
privacy. That it's being undermined in a variety of ways-the Internet,
surveillance in every store, every bank, even driving down the street.
There's real concern about abuse by the press or anyone else of that
kind of technology. There are infrared cameras that can not only get a
usable photo right through a window with a sheer curtain but
tremendously detailed photos through venetian blinds. 1

Then, with an ominous view of evolving technology, Masur warned
that "[s]oon they'll be able to shoot right through a wall."2 2 As
though to provide bizarre confirmation of the potential of such
technologies, Michael Moore recently announced on LarryKingLive
that he had just made available to viewers of his television program,
The Awful Truth, a new Web site that offered, among other
tantalizing images, around-the-clock surveillance of the interior of

18.
19.
at3.
20.
21.
22.

See Amy Pyle, New Fight for Celebrities'Heirs,L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1999, at A3.
Frank James, PrivacyLegislation Popularon CapitolHill, Cm. TRIB., May 31, 1999,
See Pyle, supra note 18.
Oldenburg, supra note 17.
Id.
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a Manhattan apartment owned by Monica Lewinsky confidant and
literary agent, Lucianne Goldberg.2 3
Such concerns about privacy and the need for legal protection are,
of course, hardly new. Well over a century ago, Warren and
Brandeis wrote the seminal HarvardLaw Review article in which
they called for redress against a "press [that] is overstepping in
every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and decency" 24 and
lamented that "[t]o satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual
relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers."2 5
That the impetus for this manifesto was as seemingly trivial as
unwelcome publicity about the guest list for a Beacon Hill dinner
party takes nothing from the majesty, or the prescience, of the
article's central thesis. A major national movement was launched,
reflecting a concern of utmost importance.
Warren and Brandeis were, however, to achieve only partial
success in their quest for legal recognition of a right of privacy.
Most states do respect and enforce such a right in some form;
Minnesota recently joined the fold, leaving North Dakota and
Yet, for several reasons,
Wyoming as the only two holdouts.
including the potentially chilling effect of privacy-based suits
against the media, courts have remained reluctant to grant recovery
for the accurate and truthful, even if highly unwelcome, disclosure
of information or images that may embarrass or even devastate
people who wish for privacy.
This article first examines the central premise for protection of
privacy, then reviews some countervailing considerations, and
concludes by examining some of the uneasy accommodations that
courts have reached in these turbulent times.
II. THE CASE FOR PRIVACY
Given a choice, most people would wish to retain complete control
of the public release of private information or images. Take the
poignant case of the late tennis star Arthur Ashe. He had known for

23. LarryKingLive (CNN television broadcast, May 21,1999), availablein LEXIS, News,
Library, Transcripts File.
24. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
196 (1890).
25. Id.
26. See Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998); see also
Minnesota High Court GrantsRight to Privacy,N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 2, 1998, at 23.
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many months that he had AIDS as the result of a blood transfusion
administered just before technology made detection and removal of
such impurities from donated plasma possible. He must have
known that his secret would someday become public, if only through
his inevitable death. But Ashe was ill prepared for the call he
received one spring day from a sports writer, who claimed to have
reliable information about Ashe's condition and gave him, in effect,
a few hours to break the news himself or have it broken for him.
Ashe decided to take the initiative. He quickly convened a press
conference at the studio where he had been a frequent
commentator." The editor's inquiry obviously forced Ashe's hand in
a dramatic way.
Though Arthur Ashe, like many people with well-kept secrets,
must have known that the news would eventually come out, he
fervently wished to control the timing and the manner of any
announcement in order to protect his family, close friends, and
business associations. Indeed, his concern was quite similar to that
of Messrs. Warren and Brandeis, albeit of a graver and more urgent
quality. It was, quite simply, the basic human desire to control
one's life and destiny in ways that media intrusion or preemption
may completely undermine or destroy. Such a wish for control of
one's life seems to deserve legal protection of a fairly high order.
There are various sources that provide formal support for such an
interest. The Constitution protects privacy in myriad ways, as the
Supreme Court recently reminded us in the ride-along case. Most
obvious is the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of the sanctity of the
home against improper searches.2" Those searches are increasingly
executed by means that do not entail a physical entry or trespass,
but, as the California legislature and supreme court have recently
recognized, may be no less invasive.
One might easily forget that this amendment also protects one's
"papers and effects" as well as one's place of residence.29 The Fifth
Amendment's self-incrimination clause, as the Supreme Court
stressed, "enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which

27. This event has a poignant personal quality. During the entire morning and early
afternoon of this fateful day, I sat next to Arthur Ashe in Manhattan as a fellow director of
a New York-based foundation. Ironically, much of our agenda involved health care funding
and research. None of his board colleagues had any inkling of Arthur Ashe's disease until we
received urgent calls from the foundation's president that evening.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
29. See Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 1697-98 (1999).
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government may not force him to surrender to his detriment."30 By
implication, the Bill of Rights encompasses such personal privacy
as the marital relationship, specifically the use of contraceptives,3 '
and will undoubtedly in time extend beyond heterosexual marriage
to the realm of sexual orientation and preference as well:
Finally, it would be easy but dangerous to forget that the First
Amendment itself protects privacy in two important ways. For half
a century, government has been barred from forcing citizens to
declare or express an abhorrent belief, whether by having to salute
the flag3 2 or display the state motto on one's license plate.33 To that
extent, one's innermost thoughts and beliefs remain private, beyond
government's capacity to know, much less to have publicly declared.
In a way that also serves the interest of privacy, the First Amendment implies a freedom of association, permitting a citizen to keep
private the organizations to which he or she belongs, supports, or
whose meetings he or she attends.3 4
This impressive litany ofconstitutional privacy precepts, however,
strongly implies a corollary: Where privacy is not formally protected, conflicts between privacy-based claims and other constitutional safeguards (notably freedom of the press) should be resolved
in favor of the non-privacy interest. Beyond the home, or one's
"papers and effects," beyond freedom of association and freedom not
to speak, the rationale for privacy protection is far less compelling
and weighs less forcefully against other constitutional interests that
may be of no higher order, but have more explicit underpinning.
That is where freedom of the press enters the equation.

III. THE CASE FOR THE PRESS
Where privacy and the press come directly into conflict, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the need for sensitive
accommodation. Through a series of cases, the Justices have set
forth three guidelines that are helpful, if not dispositive. First, the
Court has found highly suspect any government effort to suppress
the truth, or to deter its publication by prior restraint or even by
subsequent punishment.3 "[S]tate action to punish the publication

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484 (1965).
See id. at 485-86.
See West Virginia State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
See Woolley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-63 (1958).
See Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979).
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of truthful information," the Court cautioned, "seldom can justify
constitutional sanctions." 6 Second, however, the word is "seldom"
and not "never"; the justices have always stopped short of creating
an absolute privilege for publishing the truth. Third, in the most
relevant cases, the Court has set three essential conditions that will
cause a decree or a judgment prohibiting or restricting publication
to fail. The information must be truthful, have been lawfully
obtained, and be of interest to the public.3 Thus, even when state
law may, for example, purport to forbid or punish publication of the
name of a sexual assault victim,3" a juvenile offender,39 or the
adverse report of an appraisal of the performance of a state court
judge,4" the First Amendment intercedes and thwarts such sanctions. In such cases, recognizing a "sphere of collision between
claims of privacy and those of the free press,"4 ' the justices have
underscored the Jeffersonian value of a free press "to our type of
government in which the citizenry is the final judge of the proper
conduct of public business. 42
These prescriptions leave unanswered two tantalizing questions.
The Court has never indicated whether a failure to meet any one of
these three desiderata would be fatal to a free press claim; the facts
of the relevant cases all came well within the rules. The other issue,
the focus of much that follows, is whether there may be some
truthful and newsworthy disclosures of information that was
lawfully obtained, which nonetheless may warrant some legal
redress to protect basic interests in personal privacy.
IV. ACCOMMODATION: PRIVATE INFORMATION
Striking a balance between these two sets of interests has posed
a special challenge in the realm of information, from the Beacon Hill
guest list in the 1880s, to Arthur Ashe's HIV status in the 1980s, to
many issues that persist and will surely be with us well into the
new millennium. Normally, information that becomes public
despite efforts to conceal or withhold it would be protected unless
that information is false, in which case libel claims might avail, or

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989).
See id. at 532.
See Smith, 443 U.S. at 104.
See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842 (1978).
Cox Broad. Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
Id. at 495.
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has been unlawfully obtained, in which case not only the publisher
but also the one who obtained it would presumably face sanctions.
Yet the case of Arthur Ashe, indeed the whole issue of HIV status
and AIDS, supremely tests our assumptions about where properly
to draw the line.
The inescapable question is whether disclosure of AIDS infection
or HIV status is somehow different from other facts that people
fervently wish not to be publicly disclosed. There are obvious
differences of degree: the stigma that such news almost automatically creates, deep and pervasive societal fear about a contagious
and potentially fatal disease, and the possibly devastating effects on
family, professional, personal, and business relationships.
Three early cases involving AIDS disclosure in the workplace
stopped short of recognizing an actionable privacy claim, though on
grounds that reflected either very limited dissemination of the news
or uncertainty about the identity of the subject.4" All three courts
recognized that revealing AIDS or HIV status is different, at least
in degree, from almost anything else that might truthfully be said
about a person's private life.'
As we await the first case that will squarely test this issue, should
the media be concerned? Or can they continue to rely comfortably
on a First Amendment defense for telling the truth? Courts will
surely be sympathetic to any AIDS victim whose life has been
altered and career quite possibly ruined by a disclosure that (as in
Arthur Ashe's case) may serve a purpose no nobler than selling more
newspapers or raising the Nielsen rating. Thus, despite the general
presumption in favor of truth, media equities in such cases will be
tempered by an emotional presumption that favors, to an unusual
degree, the person who seeks legal protection for his privacy.
There are several caveats, even for the boldest and most callous
of publishers. Such highly sensitive information about personal
health and disease does not normally come to light unless an
adversary has had access to legally privileged medical files. The
invasion need not, in order to defeat the free press claim, have been
perpetrated by the editor or on his or her orders. It would suffice to
show that the media were simply willing beneficiaries of someone
43. See Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 269-70 (2d Cir. 1994); Robert C. Ozer, P.C.
v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 379-80 (Colo. 1997); Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 693
(Ind. 1997).
44. See City ofNew York, 15 F.3d at 267; Ozer, 940 P.2d at 377; Methodist Hosp., 690
N.E.2d at 684.
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else's trespass, larceny, or hacking, even if the editor was unaware
of the means by which the story came to light and failed to inquire."'
Closely related would be a potential concern about going beyond
the basis on which, or purpose for which, the infected person
revealed his condition. One federal case offers an apt illustration.
A Delta Airlines agent in New York City sought the aid of the city's
human rights commission to recover the job he lost when the airline
learned he was HIV-positive.4 6 The commission prevailed, and the
employee was soon back at work. 7 Flush with victory, the agency
issued a press release about the case.4" Though the affected
employee was not named, he argued in his suit against the city that
intimate details in the release unmistakably identified him to coworkers and friends.4 9
The core of the agent's case was that he revealed his condition to
the agency for a very limited purpose-getting his job back-and that
the commission went far beyond that purpose with its self-serving
press release.5 ° While the federal courts stopped short of awarding
damages against the city, they recognized this as an unusually
appealing privacy claim.51
We might go one step further: Suppose a New York newspaper or
TV station wrote or produced a story on the basis of the press
release, inflicting far greater damage on the Delta employee than
the agency's own relatively obscure announcement. Conventional
wisdom says that the media may not be penalized for reporting
truthfully the official acts of a public agency. Yet there is something
hauntingly different about this case-both in the devastating nature
of the information and the way in which a disclosure made for one
purpose was used, without permission or even warning, for a
different and far riskier purpose.
The Delta-HIV case had a loosely analogous precursor where
recovery was allowed.5 2 A sexual assault victim filed a complaint at

45. Such a conclusion is buttressed by the other recent "ride-along" case, in which the
Ninth Circuit treated reporters accompanying an invasive arrest as "government actors" for
purposes of possibly shared civil liability. See Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 514-16 (9th
Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom., Cable News Network v. Berger, 119 S. Ct. 2039 (1999).
46. See City of New York, 15 F.3d at 265.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 268-69.
51. See id. at 269-70.
52. See York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963).
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a Los Angeles police station.5 3 She agreed to be photographed in the
area of impact for evidentiary purposes.5 4 She did not expect, and
was startled to learn, that within a few days some graphic photos of
her private parts replaced Penthouse and Hustler across the desks
of the Los Angeles Police Deparment ("LAPD").5 5 She sued the
LAPD and the culpable officers in federal court, and prevailed,
partly because the way the intimate photos were used far exceeded
the purpose for which she understood they would be used, and on
the basis of which she consented to quite intimate images.5 6
Several other legal remedies should concern our AIDS-insensitive
publisher. Beyond libel, which requires proof of falsehood, reputation is protected in some states by the closely related doctrine of
"false light privacy."5 7 Even a truthful disclosure may be reported
in such a way as to imply or suggest something damaging or
offensive about a person. In the AIDS context, the "false-light" risk
seems especially acute-an implication, for example, that either
sexual promiscuity or drug injection brought about the disease.
Only where, as in Arthur Ashe's case, there exists a well-known
benign explanation for the condition could the media rest comfortably on their First Amendment protection for truthful reporting.
Finally, some thought should be given to the long recognized tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. As far as public
officials and public figures are concerned, the potential for any such
claim was put to rest by the Supreme Court's First Amendment
rejection of Reverend Jerry Falwell's claims against Hustler
magazine and its publisher, Larry Flynt.5" Such recourse may,
however, survive for less notorious plaintiffs. A California appellate court recently sustained just such a claim against a Sacramento
television station.5 9 Its camera crew interviewed several unsupervised children about the murders of two of their playmates that
occurred moments earlier-a tragedy about which the subjects first
learned from the reporter, on camera.6 9 In allowing recovery of
damages for emotional distress, the appeals court observed that the

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See id. at 452.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 456.
See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 386-91 (1967).
See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
See KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431,432 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
See id.
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reporter "was bent upon making news, not gatheringit" and might
therefore be culpable for the children's emotional trauma.6 '
To conclude on the matter of information, before turning to
images, a final comment is in order. Revealing (truthfully) that a
seemingly healthy person has AIDS or is HIV-positive seems to
present an unusually compelling case for judicial recognition of a
claim for invasion of privacy. We can only speculate what courts
will do when they encounter the "pure" privacy case. A short
answer, possibly sufficient, is that such a case is bound to be
emotionally more appealing, but is legally indistinguishable. The
longer answer is that many courts will seek ways of granting some
relief to victims of such disclosures, consistent with the First
Amendment. Courts may treat such revelations as inherently
stigmatizing, which could invoke the "false light" doctrine. Other
courts may presume that such sensitive information would never
come to light unless there were some sort of illegality-breach of a
legally protected privilege, for example-or unless reasonable
expectations for very limited use of the information were violated or
exceeded, as in the Delta employee case. There will almost certainly
be a third group ofjudges, no less sympathetic to privacy plaintiffs,
who will balance the equities differently and deny relief. They will
remind us that the truth is often painful, and sometimes devastating, but that it is no less the truth when it inflicts such harm.
V. ACCOMMODATION: PRIVACY OF VISUAL IMAGES
Now we turn to the paparazzi, and the currently precarious
condition of those who aggressively or surreptitiously gather visual
images. Here, of course, the basis for a claim of constitutional
protection differs from that which we applied to facts and information. We are now concerned much less about what the media may
publish and much more about how they maygather material. The
media have been notably less successful in establishing constitutional status for seeking news than for disseminating it. 62 Reporters
may, for example, not withhold the identity of confidential sources
63
from a grand jury.

61. Id. at 435.
62. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) ("[N]either the First
Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government
information or sources of information within the government's control.")
63. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91 (1972).
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The press can very seldom make a special claim of access to places
where news is being made. Even the well-established right of
reporters to attend and report on criminal trials is really a right of
the general public, from which the media could not be selectively
barred." Once in the courtroom, a reporter's access guarantees no
more than use of pen and paper. Cameras are admitted by grace
rather than by right; tape recorders, laptops, and sketch pads are
usually allowed, but by judicial option rather than by First Amendment fiat.
It is in this rather different context that courts have addressed
the growing tension between the harried or embattled subject and
the aggressive or intrusive paparazzo. The issue is not that of
access, but whether the taking or the use of an image or picture may
be restrained, or may be the occasion for relief sought by the subject
because of the way in which, or the place from which, it was taken.
Here, too, there is a simple rule that seems nearly sufficient, but
turns out to pose as many problems as it solves. The conventional
wisdom is that one has no legal recourse against being photographed in a public place-no matter how embarrassing the image
may be, however much the subject might wish he or she had not
been there, had dressed or behaved differently, had been with a
different person, etc. Simply venturing out onto the street makes
one fair game for cameras, whether those cameras are obvious and
visible to the subject or concealed in places from which one would
never expect to be observed, much less photographed. The rationale, reflected in Dean William Prosser's view and eventually
embodied in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, is that taking a
person's photograph in a public place "amounts to nothing more
than making a record, not differing essentially from a full written
description, of a public sight which any one present would be free to
65
see."
The clarity of our view on this issue is matched by its novelty.
Not much over a year ago, the Supreme Court of Canada reached a
strikingly different conclusion. The case involved a woman who, as
a teenager in Montreal a decade earlier, was photographed from the
street while she was relaxing on the steps of a building.6 6 The
picture appeared in a magazine article about urban living conditions

64. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980).
65. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 392 (1960); see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-6521 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
66. See Aubry v. Editions Vice-Versa, Inc., [1998] S.C.R. 591, 610-11 (Can.).
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in two Canadian cities.67 The subject claimed that the publication
exposed her to ridicule among her classmates.6" On that basis, she
sought damages from the photographer.69 Canada's high court,
invoking an unusually protective Quebec law, upheld a substantial
judgment in the subject's favor.7"
The court noted that the unconsented use of the picture was "an
infringement of the person's right to his or her image," a right
available as much to the ordinary citizen as to the celebrity.7 ' Such
a claim might not have prevailed in other provinces, though the
supreme court's judgment leaves them free to recognize it. In
fairness, Canadian courts do exempt from privacy claims an
unwelcome image of a subject in a large crowd, as at an athletic
event or a public demonstration.72
Conversely, our legal system makes certain exceptions to the
seemingly clear principle of nonprivacy. Pictures, like words, may
of course be defamatory.73 Images may also create so inaccurate and
injurious an impression as to trigger the false light doctrine.74 Most
importantly, celebrities have legal power to prevent the unauthorized use for commercial purposes of their likeness, voice, and even
name.75 There are many questions and variations, such as whether
such a right survives the demise of the subject, how far it may apply
beyond directly commercial uses, and the like.
Moreover, there is a Supreme Court case that is sometimes cited
as authority for a broad-based privacy claim.76 Hugo Zacchini made
his living being shot out of canons at county and state fairs.77 One
evening, his entire act, having been filmed earlier that day without
his consent, was featured on a Cleveland television news
broadcast.78 Zacchini sued, and the damages he won at trial

67. See id. at 611.
68. See id. at 621.
69. See id. at 611.
70. See id. at 622-23.
71. Id. at 615; see also Photo Violates Privacy, CanadaCourt Says, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10,
1998, at A10.
72. See Aubry, [19981 S.C.R. at 617; see also Canada Court Rules News Photos Violate
Privacy, MEDIA DAILY, Apr. 10, 1998, available in 1998 WL 9943030.
73. See, e.g., White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266, 291 (1845).
74. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 386-91 (1967).
75. See, e.g., Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342,347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); see
also Diane L. Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?,9 DEPAUL J. ART &
ENT. L. 35, 56-57 (1998).
76. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
77. See id. at 563.
78. See id. at 564.
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survived a sharply divided Supreme Court.vs The majority viewed
his claim not as one for invasion of privacy-after all, he performed
in very public places-but rather as the uncompensated appropriation of very valuable property, resulting in potential dilution of his
livelihood."0 Because it protects property rather than privacy, the
Zacchini decision provides a footnote and not an exception.
We thus return to the pure privacy claim. The hard cases concern
ordinary people under relatively ordinary conditions. There is surprisingly little certainty on how far legal protection against
unwanted images intrudes upon First Amendment freedoms ofthose
who gather and publicize photographic images. Perhaps the most
appealing case-the one that has triggered much of the recent
legislative frenzy-involves a subject so harried or hounded as to be
effectively unable to enter or leave home, take children to or from
school, shop, worship, or engage in the myriad essential tasks of
life."' Such was the case with Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis and her
children, pursued to the point of paralysis until a federal judge
ordered a photographer to keep a certain distance at bay, and
refrain from other practices that had effectively immobilized this
famous family.
Recently, a California judge provided similar relief to Arnold
Schwarzenneger and Maria Shriver after a paparazzo grazed their
car and nearly prevented delivery of their child to school. 3 Such
victims as these ought to need no special privacy laws, whether the
person who makes life miserable for them is a photographer or an
extortionist. Existing sanctions against harassing, assault, stalking,
and the like should suffice. Using such examples to justify new
curbs on paparazzi only serves to confuse and distort.
As the recent ride-along case vividly reminds us, invasion of the
home also poses difficult questions. The sanctity of one's home is,
after all, at the core of the Fourth Amendment. If a photographer
physically breaks into a house to obtain a picture, no claim of
"newsworthiness" would avail.8" Trespassing on the lawn or
driveway to obtain an image would also incur potential liability.
Less clear is how courts should treat the rapidly emerging challenge

See id. at 578.
See id. at 567.
See Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
See id. at 998.
See John IHiscock, Paparazziat Bay asPrivacyLaw GuardsHollywood Stars, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Jan. 2, 1999, at 5.
84. See, e.g., Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768, 780-81 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
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of virtual or technological trespass, which involves no physical entry
or intrusion. One of the bills recently pending in Congress would
ban the use of visual or auditory enhancement devices to obtain
words or images"5
A federal district court recently granted relief to a harried family
against the use of highly sensitive cameras and microphones to
obtain images and conversations from inside the home and environs,
even though the camera crew remained at all times on a public
waterway adjacent to the property.8 6 It is too early to tell how far
other courts, or even the court of appeals in this case, will extend
traditional trespass concepts to such electronic intrusions. If new
technologies penetrate the walls of a house, the case for some relief
seems appealing, even though no trespass claim would otherwise
exist.
Even images gathered in public places may create confusion. A
California appeals court recently upheld recovery by the victim of an
automobile accident who objected to pictures that had been taken of
her, in maimed condition, en route to a hospital." She also protested the concurrent disclosure of sensitive personal information.8 8
Such a judgment reminds us that legal protection of privacy may
extend beyond the physical confines of one's home. The critical
question, which courts have barely begun to address, is where and
to what extent reasonable expectations of privacy beyond the home
warrant some relief against unwelcome photographic invasions or
intrusions.
Two cases at opposite ends of the spectrum seem fairly clear. On
one hand, if a camera or tape recorder is surreptitiously placed in an
article of clothing or a purse or briefcase or wallet, that would seem
as clearly invasive of the subject's privacy as breaking into the home.
On the other hand, concealing a camera on a street, or in a park, a
store, or some other public place may yield images that are deeply
offensive and intrusive, but would not amount to a legally actionable
invasion of privacy. The hard cases lie between these two situations.
What about a camera concealed in the stall of a washroom, a
dressing room, or a locker room, for example? These are places

85. See Protection from Personal Intrusion Act, H.R. 2448, 105th Cong. (1997).

86. See Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1420-21 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
87. See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 476 (Cal. 1998).
88. See id. at 478.
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outside the home or the office where some level of privacy is
reasonably expected, whatever the form of intrusion. 9
If a person spies through a hole in the wall or the ceiling, we view
that as an unconscionable (and sometimes unlawful) invasion of
privacy. Even though such places do not enjoy the same constitutional presumption of privacy as would the home or office itself, they
are not places where one's mere presence should make one fair game
for the lens or the microphone.
Whatever qualifications may be recognized in special situations,
the basic principle remains firm: There should be no legal recourse
for images obtained in a public place, at least in a place where there
is no reasonable expectation of privacy for any other purpose. This
result may not have been the one Messrs. Warren and Brandeis
would have wished. It is surely not one that courts in most other
countries observe. Yet no rule less protective of the gathering of
information or images comports with our First Amendment values
and traditions.
VI. CONCLUSION.

The constitutional implications for the yet untested California
anti-paparazzi law, and for similar measures under active consideration in Congress and the legislatures of other states, are far less
clear than proponents or opponents might wish. On one hand, the
historic role of privacy has been to protect only that which is truly
not public-the physical sanctity of the home, the integrity of"papers
and effects," and the right of citizens to withhold most information
they wish not to reveal. Conversely, when a person leaves the home
or enters a public place, anything and everything becomes fair game,
"private" or not. What troubles us these days is the degree to which
rapidly changing technology and novel means of gathering information and images serve to blur these traditional and once clear
distinctions. The use of electronic devices on public streets and
sidewalks to "invade" the private home, without any physical
trespass, most acutely tests our once easy assumptions. If such
activities are viewed solely from the place where they occur, they do
not invade protected privacy any more than an unwelcome photo
taken in a public place or facts overheard in a street conversation.

89. For a situation in which the Supreme Court of Calfornia found a limited but
legitimate" expectation of privacy in the workplace, against the broadcasting even of
conversations that a coworker. could well have overheard, see Sanders v. American
BroadcastingCos., 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999).
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Yet there is something different about the new technological
invasions, if only in terms of the subject's reasonable expectations
for what images and information the law protects. How far, we must
soon begin to decide, may those expectations serve to extend or
reshape the historic line between what is public and what is private?
The first case in which courts must resolve that issue cannot be
more than months away, and we shall all await its coming with a
mixture of curiosity and apprehension.

